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I. INTRODUCTION
Most states prohibit the issuance of automobile liability insurance unless
coverage is also provided for injury incurred due to the acts of an operator of
an uninsured motor vehicle.' While most states make uninsured motorist
(UM) insurance mandatory, a few states make UM coverage optional. UM
coverage provides the insured with the same protection that would be available
had the insured been in an accident with a vehicle that maintained proper
liability insurance.' UM protection obligates the insurer to pay for damages
incurred through the operation, ownership, or maintenance of a motor vehicle.3
With UM protection, the victim recovers from his own insurance company.
The amount of coverage statutorily required generally mirrors that re-
quired for bodily injury or death. Missouri follows the majority of states by
mandating that UM protection be provided in all automobile liability policies
issued in the state.' The current minimum is twenty-five thousand dollars for
1. A. WIDIss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE § 3.1, at 127
(1969); Comment, Insurance Law: The Kansas Uninsured Motorist Statute-"Other
Insurance Clauses" and the Problem of the "Unnamed Insured," 16 WASHBURN L.J.
764 (1977); see AM. JUR. 2D DESK BOOK, 319-27 (1979) (chart analyzing major auto
compensation laws indicating states with mandatory uninsured motorist coverage).
2. Putnam v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 48 Ill. 2d 71, 76, 269 N.E.2d 97,
106 (1970); AUTO. L. REP. (CCH) 2000.
3. AUTO. L. REP. (CCH) 2000.
4. Mo. REV. STAT. § 379.203 (Supp. 1983) provides:
No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or
issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or
principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supple-
mental thereto, in not less than the limits for bodily injury or death set forth
1
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bodily injury or death of one person in any one accident and up to fifty thou-
sand dollars per accident ("25/50" coverage).5
An insured often is involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist
where more than one policy will be applicable. For instance, an insured may
be a passenger involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist. The host
driver presumably has UM coverage which covers occupant passengers. More-
over, the occupant has insurance that provides coverage to him while riding in
his car as well as while a passenger or driver in another. Assume both policies
provide the statutory 25/50 minimum UM protection ($25,000 per person,
$50,000 per accident). If the occupant suffers more than $25,000 in injuries,
the question arises whether the insured may "stack" the two available policies
of $25,000 each to compensate for $50,000 of injury. This is an example of
inter-policy stacking.6
A similar question arises in the intra-policy setting. This occurs when an
insured owns two automobiles and insures them both with the same insurer on
the same policy. If the insured is involved in an accident with an uninsured
motorist, the question is whether the insured can "stack" the UM coverage of
the two automobiles. Although the courts vary, the general trend has been to
allow stacking in an increasing number of circumstances.
II. INTER-POLICY STACKING
The language of the UM section of insurance policies is very similar. The
1963 Standard Family Combination Automobile Liability Policy is a typical
policy providing for UM coverage.7 Most policies, including the 1963 Stan-
in section 303.030, RSMo, for the protection of persons insured thereunder
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of unin-
sured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including
death, resulting therefrom. Such legal entitlement exists although the identity
of the owner or operator of the motor vehicle cannot be established because
such owner or operator and the motor vehicle departed the scene of the occur-
rence occasioning such bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death,
before identification. It also exists whether or not physical contact was made
between the uninsured motor vehicle and the insured or the insured's motor
vehicle. Provisions affording such insurance protection against uninsured mo-
torists issued in this state prior to October 13, 1967, shall, when afforded by
any authorized insurer, be deemed, subject to the limits prescribed in this
section, to satisfy the requirements of this section.
5. Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.030.5 (Supp. 1983). These limits were effective Au-
gust 13, 1982. Prior to that time, the limits were $10,000 for bodily injury to one
person and $20,000 per accident (10/20) coverage. Id. § 303.030.5 (1978).
6. Thus, "[i]ntra-policy stacking is the aggregation of the limits of liability for
uninsured-motorist coverage of each car covered in one policy, whereas inter-policy
stacking involves the aggregation of coverage under more than one policy." Taft v.
Cerwonka, 433 A.2d 215, 217 n.3 (R.I. 1981).
7. There are currently several standard-form motor vehicle liability policies in
use. Committees representing insurance companies of the Mutual Insurance Rating
Bureau and the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters (renamed the Insurance
[Vol. 49572
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dard Family Combination Policy, provide UM coverage not only for the
named insured, but also for those occupying an insured automobile. 8 Thus, the
named insured is protected by his UM coverage when involved in an accident
while in his own car as well as when he is riding as a passenger in someone
else's car, or even when struck by an automobile as a pedestrian. The "occu-
pancy insured" coverage extends only to those involved in accidents while rid-
ing in an insured automobile. For instance, when the named insured is the host
of a guest, the guest is covered by the host's UM coverage as an "occupancy
insured," provided that the host is driving an "insured" automobile covered by
the host's policy.8
The Standard Family Combination Policy also includes several provisions
which attempt to limit the amount of coverage. In the inter-policy setting,
"other insurance" clauses come into play.10 These clauses, such as the "excess-
escape" clause, attempt to limit the amount of available insurance to the dif-
ference between the amount covered by the primary insurance and the maxi-
Rating Bureau in 1968) prepared these standard policies. AUTO. L. REP. (CCH) f
2000. Many of the large stock and mutual casualty companies have adopted these stan-
dard policies. The Standard Family Combination Automobile Policy and the Standard
General-Automobile Liability and Garage Insurance Policy Forms are representative of
such policies. Most insurance companies utilize standard-form policies. Several inde-
pendent companies, such as Allstate Insurance Company and State Farm Mutual Au-
tomobile Ins,rance Company, use their own policies. Id.
8. 'he 1963 Standard Family Combination Automobile Policy states:
To pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be
legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an unin-
sured automobile because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death
resulting therefrom, hereinafter called "bodily injury," sustained by the in-
sured, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of such uninsured automobile ...
AUTO. LAW REP. (CCH) 2271.
"Insured" means:
(a) the named insured and any relative; (b) any other person while occupy-
ing an insured automobile; and (c) any person, with respect to damages he is
entitled to recover because of bodily injury to which this Part applies sus-
tained by an insured under (a) or (b) above.
Id. §§ 2275-78. The Allstate and the State Farm forms also provide UM protection for
occupants of insured automobiles. Id. 11 2675-78, 3264-66.
9. It is also likely that the guest has auto insurance that has UM coverage
which would apply to him as a "named insured."
10. Automobile liability policies typically utilize three types of "other insur-
ance" provisions: the "pro-rata clause," the "excess clause," and the "escape clause."
Putnam v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 48 Ill.2d 71, 76, 269 N.E.2d 97, 99 (1970).
The pro-rata clause comes into play when other insurance is available. This clause
typically states that the company will be "liable only for the proportion of the loss
represented by the ratio between its policy limit and the total limits of all available
insurance." Id. The "excess clause" provides that the company is liable only for
amounts over and above other insurance. The "escape clause" renders the policy void
"with respect to any hazard as to which other insurance exists." Id. These clauses are
frequently used in combination in automobile liability policies.
1984]
3
Peterson: Peterson: Stacking of Uninsured Motorist Coverage
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
mum amount covered under the secondary insurance." For instance, if an in-
sured is a passenger in a host's automobile and is involved in an accident with
another, uninsured, motorist, two UM policies are available: the host's policy
and the guest's policy. The primary insurance could be deemed that main-
tained by the host, while the guest's personal UM coverage would be consid-
ered secondary.' 2 Assuming both policies provide the requisite minimum UM
11. The 1963 Standard Family Combination Automobile Policy provides:
Other Insurance. With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying
an automobile not owned by the named insured, the insurance under Part IV
shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance available
to such insured and applicable to such automobile as primary insurance, and
this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the limit of liabil-
ity for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other
insurance.
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has other
similar insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the dam-
ages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of lia-
bility of this insurance and such other insurance, and the company shall not
be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which this Coverage applies
than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits
of liability of this insurance and such other insurance.
AUTo. LIAB. INS. (CCH) 2315. The Allstate and State Farm policies have similar
provisions. See id. 11 2711, 3420-21. This clause is essentially an "excess-escape" hy-
brid. Putnam, 48 Ill. 2d at 77, 269 N.E.2d at 100. The first part of the first paragraph
is the "excess" clause, providing that if other insurance is available, the policy will
apply only to the excess. The second part of this paragraph is the "escape," limiting
liability to the amount the policy limits exceed that of the other policy. Id. Although
the clause purports to provide "excess" coverage, as a practical matter most UM cover-
age is for the minimum amount required by state law. Consequently, there is rarely
any "excess." Id.; see A. WIDISS, supra note 1, § 2.59, at 106-07.
The second paragraph is the "pro-rata" provision. This provision is effective only if
the excess-escape clause does not apply. Comment, supra, note 1, at 765-66 n.9; see
Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 551. 552 n.3 (1969). For instance, if the insured has two policies,
each with the statutory minimum coverage (25/50), each policy would presumably
cover the damage up to the maximum coverage provided. Even if the insured suffers
$50,000 of damages, the pro-rata clause provides that each policy will pay only
$12,500, the pro-rata share of the limit of liability. See A. WIDIss, supra note 1, §
2.61, at 114.
As seen from the insured's point of view, the pro-rata clause has the same effect as
the excess-escape clause. A. WIDIss, supra note 1, § 2.61, at 113. In both instances, the
clauses attempt to limit total recovery to the maximum coverage amount specified, gen-
erally the minimum amount required by statute. Id. The pro-rata clause helps the in-
surers to divide that maximum amount among themselves, rather than being liable for
the full amount alone.
12. Frequently, the host's policy and the guest's policy will contain conflicting
"other insurance" clauses. For instance, both policies may be standard policies contain-
ing verbatim excess-escape clauses. Each attempts to place primary liability on the
other insurer while limiting their coverage to only the "excess" of the other insurer.
Courts traditionally attempt to reconcile the policies by making a determination as to
which one shall be deemed "primary." Werley v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 498 P.2d
112, 117 (Alaska 1972). Courts have advanced several methods for making such a
determination. One possibility is to consider the policy issued first to be primary. See,
[Vol. 49
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coverage, now 25/50, the secondary policy's "other insurance" clause would
preclude recovery under the secondary policy. This clause limits recovery from
the secondary insurer to the "amount by which the limit of liability for this
coverage [$25,000 per person] exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such
other insurance [the host's insurance, also $25,000]." Since there is no "ex-
cess," the insured would be precluded under this clause from recovering any-
thing from his insurance company.' 3
The "excess-escape" clause seemingly prohibits stacking in the inter-pol-
icy setting. A majority of courts, however, including Missouri, have struck the
"excess-escape" clause on various theories and have allowed inter-policy stack-
ing. 4 Missouri first struck the clause in Steinhaeufel v. Reliance Insurance
e.g., New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. 108 F.2d 653,
656 (6th Cir. 1940). Another theory looks to the primary tortfeasor and deems his
policy to be primary. See, e.g., American Auto Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Mut. Indem.
Co., 161 F.2d 62, 63 (3d Cir. 1947). Also used is a theory placing liability on the
insurer more specifically covering the risk. See, e.g., Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection
& Ins. Co. v. Cochran Oil Mill & Ginnery Co., 26 Ga. App. 288, 294, 105 S.E. 856,
857 (1921). For a discussion of the primary/secondary problem and the various theo-
ries advanced, see Watson, The "Other Insurance" Dilemma, 54 ILL. B.J. 486, 488-89
(1966).
A growing number of jurisdictions have taken a different approach, adopting the
Lamb-Weston doctrine which does not deem either policy primary. Werley, 498 P.2d at
117. Rather, under this doctrine the court finds conflicting "other insurance" clauses
mutually repugnant and strikes down both clauses. The loss is then prorated between
the insurers, up to the respective policy limits, as if the policies had never contained
"other insurance" clauses. Id. The Lamb-Weston doctrine originated in Oregon Auto.
Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 1952).
Missouri adopted this doctrine in Arditi v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 315
S.W.2d 736, 743 (Mo. 1958).
13. If, however, the guest's personal UM policy limits were 50/100, this cover-
age limit would exceed that of the host's by $25,000. In this case, the secondary insurer
would also pay $25,000, if the insured suffered $50,000 of injury.
14. See, e.g., Kackman v. Continental Ins. Co., 319 F. Supp. 540, 542 (D.
Alaska 1970); Simpson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 1152, 1157
(S.D. Ind. 1970); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jones, 286 Ala. 606, 614, 243 So. 2d 736,
742 (1970); Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 185 So. 2d 689, 692 (Fla.
1966); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857, 859, 156 S.E.2d
148, 149 (1967); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Siddons, 451 S.W.2d 831, 834-35 (Ky.
1970); Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 187, 207 N.W.2d 348,
352 (1973); Harthcock v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 456, 459-60
(Miss. 1971); Steinhaeufel v. Reliance Ins. Cos., 495 S.W.2d 463, 468 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973); Protective Fire & Casualty Co. v. Woten, 186 Neb. 212, 217, 181 N.W.2d 835,
838 (1970); Motor Club of Am. Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 66 N.J. 277, 287, 330 A.2d 360,
369 (1974); Moore v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. Group, 270 N.C. 532, 544, 155 S.E.2d
128, 136 (1967); Curran v. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 25 Ohio St. 2d 33, 38, 266
N.E.2d 566, 569 (1971); Sparling v. Allstate Ins. Co., 249 Or. 471, -, 439 P.2d 616,
618 (1968); Harleysville Mut. Casualty Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, -, 241 A.2d
112, 115 (1968); Vernon v. Harleysville Mut. Casualty Co., 244 S.C. 152, 157, 135
S.E.2d 841, 844 (1964); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Gatlin, 470 S.W.2d 924, 928 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1971); Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 902, 140 S.E.2d
817, 820 (1965); see also A. WIDISS, supra note 1, § 2.60, at 210 n.4 (Supp. 1981)
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Cos.15 In Steinhaeufel, the plaintiff operated a truck owned by his employer
when, due to the negligence of another driver, he became involved in an acci-
dent with an uninsured motorist. Reliance Insurance had issued a policy to
plaintiff's employer which contained 10/20 UM coverage. The plaintiff also
had a policy issued on his personal automobile which contained 10/20 UM
coverage. This policy, by stipulation, was deemed the secondary policy and it
contained an "excess-escape" clause.16 Plaintiff sustained $15,000 of damages
and sought to stack the secondary policy limits on top of his employer's pri-
mary coverage. As previously discussed, the excess-escape clause, if upheld,
would preclude recovery from the secondary insurer.
The court looked to the purpose behind Missouri's uninsured motorist
statute and struck the clause as being against public policy.17 The court ac-
knowledged that the clause was clear and unambiguous.' 8 The court pointed
out, however, that legislation specifically required UM insurance and that the
statute contained no restriction on the insurer's liability. The purpose of the
UM legislation was to "close the gap in the protection afforded the public
under existing financial responsibility laws and, within fixed limits, to provide
compensation to innocent persons injured by motorists who lack financial re-
sponsibility."' 9 The court held that the clause was void as against public policy
and that the insurer may not limit its statutorily imposed liability by the use of
an excess-escape clause.' 0 The court relied in part on the fact that the insured
had paid for coverage under the terms of the statute and consequently should
receive the benefit of the coverage. To refuse such benefit would provide a
windfall to the insurer. 2"
Other courts have applied this "premium payment" rationale, finding that
it would be unconscionable to preclude recovery on the grounds of the excess-
escape clause when the insurer collects a premium. 2 At least one commenta-
tor argues that this unconscionability argument is specious.' 3 It is argued that
the premium charged was based upon the assumption by the insurer that the
excess-escape clause was valid. The premium charged presumably reflected the
(lists 31 states that have invalidated the excess-escape clause).
15. 495 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
16. Id. at 465. For a discussion of primary/secondary determination, see note
12 supra.
17. Id. at 468.
18. Id. at 466.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 468.
21. Id. at 467.
22. See, e.g., Simpson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 1152,
1156 (S.D. Ind. 1970); Protective First & Casualty Co. v. Woten, 186 Neb. 212, 215,
181 N.W.2d 835, 838 (1970); Harleysville Mut. Casualty Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa.
389, 396, 241 A.2d 112, 115 (1968); Comment, Stacked Recovery Under the Unin-
sured Motorist Endorsement of the Automobile Liability Policy, 9 VAL. U.L. REv.
135, 144-45 (1974).
23. Comment, supra note 22, at 144-45.
[Vol. 49
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fact that in inter-policy situations where the policy involved was the secondary
policy, only the "excess" would be paid.2 4
In the situation where the insurer purchases several policies and pays a
premium for each one, the unconscionability argument appears applicable, but
upon further analysis it becomes specious. The risk of exposure of the insurer
increases when a second car is added since named insureds and occupancy
insureds are covered. The potential membership of the class of occupancy in-
sureds is increased because there are now potentially two cars on the road at
once. It is therefore argued that it would be unreasonable to preclude an in-
surer from charging more than one premium regardless of the number of vehi-
cles insured.25 The premium increased because the risk did, but this should not
allow an insured to stack coverage as well.
Other courts have invalidated the excess-escape clause even though only
one premium was charged. In Meridian Mutual Insurance Co. v. Siddons,28
the insurer issued two policies covering two cars owned by the plaintiff. The
first policy provided UM protection and a premium was charged for it.27 The
second policy didn't mention UM coverage and nothing was charged for it.
The court treated the second policy as including UM coverage because Ken-
tucky law requires every policy to have such coverage. 28 The plaintiff's step-
son, also a named insured, was struck and killed by an uninsured motorist.
Plaintiff sought to stack the UM coverage of both policies. The court held that
the excess-insurance clause was against the clear meaning and policy of the
Kentucky UM statute which expressly required that each policy provide the
minimum statutory coverage. 29 The "other insurance" clause conflicts with
this statutory requirement and is therefore void.30
A minority of courts reject inter-policy stacking. Several different theories
have been advanced to find "excess-escape" clauses valid and thereby reject
inter-policy stacking.3' One such argument is the "substituted coverage" the-
24. Id. at 144.
25. Id. at 146.
26. 451 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970).
27. Id. at 832.
28. Id. at 833.
29. Id. at 834.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Chandler v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 342 F.2d 420, 421
(5th Cir. 1965) (inter-policy stacking by named insured under two policies issued by
different insurers rejected); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wells, 316 F.2d 770, 774 (4th Cir.
1963); Transportation Ins. Co. v. Wade, 106 Ariz. 269, 274, 475 P.2d 253, 258 (1970);
M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 245 Ark. 230, 232, 431 S.W.2d 742, 744 (1968);
Grunfeld v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 4, 8, 42 Cal. Rptr. 516, 519
(1965); Putnam v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 48 Ill. 2d 71, 89, 269 N.E.2d 97,
106 (1970); Burcham v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 255 Iowa 69, 75, 121 N.W.2d 500, 503
(1963); Le Blanc v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 So. 2d 791, 796 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Cohen
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 35 A.D.2d 719, 720, 315 N.Y.S.2d 265, 266 (1970); Lyon v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 316, 480 P.2d 739, 743 (1971);
Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 66 Wash. 2d 871, 876, 405 P.2d 712, 715 (1965).
1984]
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ory. This theory looks to the purpose behind the state's uninsured motorist
statute-placing the insured in the same position he would have been in had
the tortfeasor been insured.32 In Missouri, if the tortfeasor complies by
purchasing the minimum bodily injury insurance required, $25,000 per person
and $50,000 per accident, only this amount would be available.33 Thus, if an
insured is allowed to stack, the minority argues that he is better off to be
involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist than one with the minimal
statutory requirements. By stacking, the insured can increase the minimum
coverage from 25/50 to 50/100. Since this is not the purpose behind the en-
actment of the uninsured motorist statutes, courts uphold the "other insur-
ance" or "excess-escape" clauses and prohibit inter-policy stacking.34 Missouri
rejected the "substituted coverage" theory in Gordon v. Maupin.35
In Putnam v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,36 plaintiffs were guests in a
friend's car and were involved in a collision with an uninsured motorist. The
host had UM coverage with 10/20 limits. The damages suffered by the plain-
tiffs exceeded $20,000. The host's insurer consequently paid the full $20,000
limit, with the plaintiffs recovering $7,500 as their apportioned share.37 The
plaintiffs then sought recovery under the UM provisions of their own policies
and asked the court to allow "stacking" of the host's policy and the guests'
policies.
The court held the plaintiffs could not stack their UM coverage.38 The
court pointed out that had the uninsured motorist maintained the minimum
liability insurance required by Illinois law, the plaintiffs would have already
recovered from their host's policy the minimum amount, $20,000. 39 The court
stated that if such stacking "were mandated as a matter of public policy, mo-
torists would be in the unusual position of preferring that any injuries sus-
tained be at the hands of uninsured motorists rather than motorists who com-
ply with the Financial Responsibility Law."'40
Courts following the minority position also argue that the insured obtains
32. Hart, Stacking of Motor Vehicle Insurance Coverage in Missouri 2x (The
Deep Pocket) (pt. I), 35 J. MO. BAR. 173, 180 (1979).
33. Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.030 (Supp. 1983) requires minimum bodily injury
insurance of $25,000 per person, $50,000 per accident.
34. See, e.g., Putnam v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 48 Ill. 2d 71, 89, 269
N.E.2d 97, 106 (1970).
35. 469 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
36. 48 Il. 2d 71, 269 N.E.2d 97 (1970).
37. Id. at 73, 269 N.E.2d at 98.
38. Id. at 89, 269 N.E.2d at 106.
39. Id. at 84, 269 N.E.2d at 104.
40. Id.; see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wells, 316 F.2d 770, 774 (4th Cir.
1963); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Howe, 106 N.H. 422, 424, 213 A.2d 420, 422 (1965)
("The [UM] statute was not designed to provide the insured with greater insurance
protection than would have been available had the insured been injured by an operator
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a windfall if stacking is allowed because he receives extra coverage that he did
not intend to purchase.4 1 Missouri refuted this argument in Steinhaeufel by
pointing out that to refuse stacking by the insured provides a windfall to the
insurer since the insured had paid the premiums for such UM coverage.42
III. INTRA-POLICY STACKING
A minority of courts, including Missouri, have expanded stacking to allow
intra-policy stacking as well.4 3 As previously mentioned, the intra-policy stack-
ing question frequently arises when the insured owns two cars and places both
on the same policy, generally paying separate premiums for each. Since under
both policies the insured may be the named insured, the question arises as to
whether stacking of the two is allowed. In this situation, the excess-insurance
clause does not come into play because there is only one insurance policy
involved.
44
In the intra-policy arena the "limits of liability" clause steps into the pic-
ture. This clause basically attempts to limit recovery to the stated policy limits
on one policy and thereby prevent intra-policy stacking.45 Courts that allow
41. Hart, supra note 32, at 180-81.
42. 495 S.W.2d at 467. A related issue comes up when insurers seek to set-off
the amount payable under the UM section with payments made under other sections.
For instance, insurers have attempted to reduce the amount payable under the UM
coverage by the amount paid under the medical pay provisions of the same policy.
Missouri has refused to allow such a reduction. Webb v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 479 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). Similarly, the court in Douthet v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 546 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. 1977) (en banc), refused to
allow the insurer to deduct amounts received by the insured under Workmen's Com-
pensation. The court stated that such a reduction would be contrary to the public pol-
icy expressed in Mo. REv. STAT. § 379.203 (1978). 546 S.W.2d at 159. Accordingly,
the court found that the policy provision reducing the sums payable under the policy by
the amount of workmen's compensation payments was void. Id. at 159. Insureds some-
times also seek to stack medical payment provisions of automobile liability policies. See
Annot., 25 A.L.R.4th 66 (1983).
43. Although the courts are split, the trend appears to favor intra-policy stack-
ing. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Harper, 125 Ga. App. 696, 700, 188
S.E.2d, 813, 816 (1972); Clayton v. Alliance Mut. Casualty Co., 212 Kan. 640, 647
512 P.2d 507, 515, reh'g denied, 213 Kan. 84, 515 P.2d 1115 (1973); Harrington v.
Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 295 So. 2d 210, 213 (La. Ct. App.
1974); Crenwelge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 277 So. 2d 155, 163 (La. Ct.
App. 1973); Johnson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 359 Mass. 525, 528, 269 N.E.2d 700,
702 (1971); Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 187, 207 N.W.2d
348, 352 (1973); Boyd v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 260 S.C. 316, 321, 195
S.E.2d 706, 708 (1973); Landvatter v. Globe Sec. Ins. Co., 100 Wis. 2d 21, -, 300
N.W.2d 875, 878 (1980).
44. The excess-insurance clause limits recovery to the amount "by which the
limit of liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other
insurance." See note 11 supra.
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intra-policy stacking find this clause void much the same way the excess-insur-
ance clause is struck down in the inter-policy stacking setting.46
In the intra-policy setting, some courts distinguish between stacking on a
"fleet" policy and stacking on a "non-fleet" policy. For the purposes of this
article, "fleet" policies include those policies expressly referred to as fleet poli-
cies as well as garage policies and any other policy covering numerous vehicles
owned by a business or governmental entity.47 Courts appear more reluctant to
allow stacking on fleet policies than non-fleet policies; they are particularly
hesitant to allow stacking on either by occupancy insureds. 48
A. Intra-Policy Stacking with Respect to Named Insureds
In the non-fleet area, a minority of courts allow intra-policy stacking by a
named insured. Several justifications have been advanced in support of intra-
policy stacking. 49 Missouri first approved such stacking in Cameron Mutual
Limits of liability:
(a) The limit of liability for family protection coverage stated in the declara-
tions as applicable to "each person" is the limit of the company's liability for
all damages, including damages for care or loss of services, because of bodily
injury sustained by one person as the result of any one accident and, subject
to the above provision respecting each person, the limit of liability stated in
the declarations as applicable to "each accident" is the total limit of the com-
pany's liability for all damages, including damages for care or loss of services,
because of bodily injury sustained by two or more persons as the result of any
one accident.
AUTO. L. REP. (CCH) % 2310. Both the Allstate and the State Farm forms include this
limits-of-liability clause almost verbatim. See id. 11 2706, 3257.
46. See notes 14-22 and accompanying text supra.
47. For an annotation of cases dealing with stacking of coverage provided by
fleet policies, see Annot., 25 A.L.R.4th 896 (1983).
48. Taft v. Cerwonka, 433 A.2d 215, 219 n.7 (R.I. 1981).
49. Some courts maintain that the limits of liability clause is ambiguous and
construe it against the insurer. See, e.g., Employers Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Jackson, 289
Ala. 673, 679, 270 So. 2d 806, 810 (1972); Squire v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co.,
69 Il1. 2d 167, 176, 370 N.E.2d 1044, 1049 (1977); Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 203
Kan. 783, 792, 457 P.2d 34, 42 (1969); Annot., 23 A.L.R.4th 12, 55-61 (1983). Other
courts have found a conflict between the "separability" clause and the "limits of liabil-
ity" clause. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Stewart, 159 Ind. App. 701, 710, 309 N.E.2d 448, 452(1974); Mountain W. Farm Bureau v. Neal, 169 Mont. 317, 325, 547 P.2d 79, 82
(1976); Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, 212 Va. 162, 183 S.E.2d 145(1971); see also Annot., 23 A.L.R.4th 12, 68-71 (1983). Still others strike the limits of
liability clause as against public policy, in much the same way courts strike down
"other insurance" clauses. See, e.g., Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d
538 (Mo. 1976) (en banc). Others are proponents of the premium payment rationale:
since the insured has paid for the coverage he should receive the benefit of stacked
recovery. See, e.g., Curran v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 393 F. Supp. 712, 715 (D.
Alaska 1975); Great Cent. Ins. Co. v. Edge, 292 Ala. 613, 616, 298 So. 2d 607, 610
(1974); Kemp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 183 Mont. 526, 534, 601 P.2d 20, 24 (1979); see
also Annot., 23 A.L.R.4th 12, 41-49 (1983).
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Insurance Co. v. Madden.50 In Cameron, the defendant insured two cars on
the same policy. The declaration page of the policy issued to the defendant
listed separately the itemized coverages for each of the two vehicles.51 10/20
UM coverage was listed for each car and a three dollar premium per car was
assessed. 52 The defendant's wife was killed in an accident due to the negli-
gence of an uninsured motorist, and it was stipulated that defendant suffered
damages in excess of $10,000. Consequently, he sought to stack the two poli-
cies to attain $20,000 coverage. The court held that the policies could be
stacked.53
The policy in contention in Cameron contained a "limits of liability"
clause similar to the 1963 Standard Family Combination Automobile Insur-
ance Policy.54 The plaintiff/insurer argued that this clause clearly and unam-
biguously limited recovery to $10,000. 55 The policy also contained a separabil-
ity clause which provided that the terms of the policy were to apply separately
to each automobile if two or more automobiles were insured under the same
policy.5 '8 The insurer argued that this clause clearly and unambiguously pro-
vides that only the policy covering the vehicle involved in the accident shall
apply.57
The Cameron court accepted the principle set forth by the Missouri Court
of Appeals for the Western District in Galloway v. Farmers Insurance Co.58
When an insured holds two separate policies with the same insurer, both con-
taining limits of liability clauses, public policy, as expressed by Missouri Re-
vised Statutes Section 379.203, 5 mandates that such clauses shall be ignored
and stacking will be allowed.60 Once this premise is accepted, the only ques-
50. 533 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
51. Id. at 539.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 545.
54. See note 45 supra.
55. 533 S.W.2d at 539.
56. Id. at 540.
57. Id. at 539.
58. 523 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
59. (Supp. 1983).
60. In Galloway, the same insurer issued two separate policies to the plaintiff,
both containing an UM provision. The defendant argued that stacking between the two
policies was prohibited by the "Other Insurance in the Company" clause. That clause
provided:
With respect to any occurrence, accident or loss to which this and any other
insurance policy or policies issued to the insured by the Company also apply,
no payment shall be made hereunder which, when added to any amount paid
or payable under such other insurance policy or policies, would result in a
total payment to the insured or any other person in excess of the highest ap-
plicable limit of liability under any one such policy.
Id. at 340. Compare the 1963 Standard Family Combination Automobile Insurance
"excess-escape" clause, supra note 11. The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern
District had previously allowed inter-policy stacking where the host driver carried one
policy and the injured party carried a second policy. Steinhaeufel, 495 S.W.2d at 463.
1984]
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tion remaining is whether the court should distinguish between an insurance
company that issues two separate policies and an insurer that elects to consoli-
date the coverage of several vehicles into one policy.6 1
The Cameron court stated that the emphasis of section 379.203 is not on
whether the insurer chooses to issue two separate policies or elects to consoli-
date coverage into a single policy.6 2 It would be an anomaly to say that after
an insurer writes coverage for several vehicles and collects the premium; the
question of how much coverage is offered consequently revolves around
whether the insurer issued two separate policies or consolidated coverage into
one.6 3 The enforceability of excess-escape clauses should not revolve around
such a distinction." Such a distinction is not implicated by the language of
section 379.203.65
The court emphasized that the question of stacking should not depend on
the draftsmanship of limiting clauses. An insurer should not be permitted to
collect a premium for a given coverage and then snatch it away with a limiting
clause, regardless of how clear and well drafted it is. 6 Consequently, the
Cameron court held that the public policy evidenced by section 379.203 pre-
cludes an insurer from limiting coverage to just one policy.17
In Cameron, the court specifically stated that, because the limiting clause
was against public policy, it was unnecessary to determine if the combination
of the "limitations of liability" clause and the "separability" clause created an
ambiguous contract.6 8 Other courts have relied on these two clauses to support
a holding that these clauses create an ambiguity and are therefore void.69 In
The plaintiff in Galloway attempted to distinguish Steinhaeufel in that in Galloway,
the injured party carried both policies himself, with only one insurer. The Galloway
court refused to recognize such a distinction, stating that public policy, as expressed in§ 379.203, specifically requires all automobile liability insurance policies to provide a
minimum UM protection of 25/50 which cannot be diminished by the policy provi-
sions. 523 S.W.2d at 343. The court said this was true whether the policy was issued
by the same insurance company or two different companies. Id.
61. Cameron, 533 S.W.2d at 542.
62. Id. at 544.
63. Id.
64. Id. Cameron quoted Tucker v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 288 So.2d
238, 242 (Fla. 1973) at length, stating in part:
It is an anomaly to contend that if two automobiles are combined in the cov-
erage of one auto liability insurance policy with uninsured motorist protection
added that an exclusion of the kind here involved may be validly inserted, but
that if a separate policy covered each automobile such exclusion is invalid.
The mere form of a policy-a combination coverage-should not be the pred-
icate for an exclusion of additional coverage.
Id.
65. 533 S.W.2d at 544.
66. Id. The Cameron court quoted Great Cent. Ins. Co. v. Edge, 292 Ala. 613,
617, 298 So. 2d 607, 609 (1974) for this proposition.
67. 533 S.W.2d at 544-45.
68. Id. at 545.
69. Jeffries v. Stewart, 159 Ind. App. 701, 707, 309 N.E.2d 448, 452 (1974);
[Vol. 49
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Mountain West Farm Bureau v. Neal,70 the insured held a single policy cover-
ing four vehicles.71 The insurer sought a declaratory judgment finding that the
insured could not stack coverage.12 The insurance policy contained a limits of
liability clause essentially identical to that contained in the 1963 Standard
Family Combination Insurance Policy.73 The policy also contained a "separa-
bility" clause. This provision stated that "[w]hen two (2) or more automobiles
are insured hereunder, the terms of Section III shall apply separately to each
... The court held that when these two clauses were considered together,
they were "contradictory, ambiguous and beyond reconciliation. 7
5
Under the limits of liability clause, the court noted that coverage for
"each person" would be limited to $10,000, the policy limit.78 Pursuant to the
separability clause, however, the limits of liability clause governed each auto-
mobile separately.77 This would provide coverage of $10,000 per automobile
for a total coverage of $40,000. Thus, under the separability clause, stacking
would be allowed.78 Under Montana law, ambiguities in insurance policies are
construed liberally in favor of insureds and strictly against insurers.7 Apply-
ing this rule of construction, the court resolved the ambiguity created by the
separability clause and the limits of liability clause against the insurer and
consequently allowed intra-policy stacking."0
A third rationale frequently relied on is the "double-premiums" or "pre-
mium payment" rationale. In Taft v. Cerwonka,8l the court addressed the is-
sue of intra-policy stacking. The court allowed intra-policy stacking based in
part upon the double-premiums rationale. The court noted that the insured
had paid two separate premiums for the uninsured motorist coverage on his
two vehicles.82 The court stated that the mere fact that the insurer had consol-
idated the coverage into a single policy should not preclude stacking.83 To so
hold would clearly defeat the reasonable expectations of the insured who had
paid two premiums for such coverage.8 4 The court emphasized that, had the
insured paid separate premiums for two separate policies, stacking certainly
Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Kan. 783, 790, 457 P.2d 34, 41 (1969); Mountain
W. Farm Bureau v. Neal, 169 Mont. 317, 322-23, 547 P.2d 79, 82 (1976); Annot., 23
A.L.R.4th 12 (1983); see note 49 supra.
70. 169 Mont. 317, 547 P.2d 79 (1976).
71. Id. at 319, 547 P.2d at 80.
72. Id. at 320, 547 P.2d at 80.
73. Id. at 321, 547 P.2d at 81; see note 45 supra.
74. 169 Mont. at 322, 547 P.2d at 81.
75. Id. at 322, 547 P.2d at 82.
76. Id. at 323, 547 P.2d at 82.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 322, 547 P.2d at 82.
80. Id. at 323, 547 P.2d at 83.
81. 433 A.2d 215 (R.I. 1981).
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would be allowed. 85
Many courts which have invalidated the "excess-escape" clause and al-
lowed inter-policy stacking have refused to extend such stacking to the intra-
policy setting."6 Cases which allow the insurer to limit liability by incorpora-
tion of the "limits of liability" clause are based on several grounds. In Allstate
Insurance Co. v. McHugh,87 the plaintiff was a named insured under a policy
which insured two automobiles. The court held that payment of separate pre-
miums of five dollars each was insufficient justification for allowing stacking
since the risk to the insurer correspondingly increased. The court thus rejected
the double-premiums argument. 88
The McHugh court also rejected the ambiguity argument relied on by
other courts. The limitation clause provided that "'each person' is the limit of
Allstate's liability for all damages arising out of bodily injury sustained by any
one person in any one occurrence." 89 The separability clause provided that
"[w]hen two or more automobiles are insured by this policy, the terms of this
policy shall apply separately to each." 0 The court found that the limits of
liability clause unambiguously prevented stacking. The court cited Polland v.
Allstate Insurance Co.91 in support of the position that the separability clause
merely renders the policy applicable to whichever car is insured under the
policy. 2 The McHugh court stated that it must enforce the insurance agree-
ment as it existed and could not rewrite the agreement for the parties.8 3
In Talbot v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,9 4 the court
found that the limits of liability provision is consistent with the uninsured mo-
torist statute and therefore prohibits intra-policy stacking by a named in-
85. Id.
86. Arminski v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 23 Mich. App. 352, 355,
178 N.W.2d 497, 499 (1970); Allstate Ins. Co. v. McHugh, 124 N.J. Super. 105, 111,
304 A.2d 777, 779 (Ch. Div. 1973), affid, 126 N.J. Super. 458, 315 A.2d 423 (1974);
Kennedy v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 255 Ore. 425, 426, 467 P.2d 963, 963
(1970).
87. 124 N.J. Super. 105, 304 A.2d 777 (Ch. Div. 1973).
88. Id. at 108, 304 A.2d at 778. The court set forth an example of how this
might occur:
It is conceivable that Frank McHugh [plaintiff] could be operating one vehi-
cle with multiple passengers therein, his wife operating the second vehicle
with multiple passengers therein. All the passengers in both vehicles are cov-
ered under Coverage S. This increased risk provides sufficient consideration
and justification for charging a separate premium at the same rate for addi-
tional cars on the same policy.
Id.
89. Id. at 109, 304 A.2d at 779.
90. Id.
91. 25 A.D.2d 16, 266 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1966).
92. 124 N.J. Super. at 110, 304 A.2d at 779.
93. Id. at 111, 304 A.2d at 780.
94. 291 So. 2d 699 (Miss. 1974).
[Vol. 49
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sured.95 The parties were free to contract with respect to UM coverage in any
way they desired so long as the statutory minimum was provided.96 Therefore,
since they could contract "free of statutory restraint" with respect to excess
coverage, they could certainly contract to limit coverage, by use of a limiting
clause, to the minimum coverage statutorily required. Since the "limits of lia-
bility" provision did this, it was consistent with the statute.97
In Grimes v. Concord General Mutual Insurance Co.,98 the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire rejected the premium payment rationale relied on in
part by the Missouri Supreme Court in Cameron.9 In Grimes, the insured
argued that, since he had paid multiple premiums for several vehicles insured
under one policy, he was entitled to stack the limits of liability. 00 The court
refused to concede that the insured, by so doing, was paying a premium for
which he received nothing.' 0' The court pointed out that, by adding another
vehicle to the policy, the risk to the insurer increased.' 02 Since both named
insureds and occupants are covered by the uninsured motorist provision of the
policy, the risk increases, since both vehicles can be on the road simultane-
ously, carrying passengers in both as well.' 03 The court did recognize that the
payment of double premiums is a factor to be considered in determining the
insured's reasonable expectations. 04
With respect to fleet policies, intra-policy stacking of UM coverage is
rarely allowed.' 05 Courts appear more inclined to allow stacking by a named
insured under a fleet policy than by an occupancy insured. 0 6 In Marchese v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,'07 the insurer had issued a "garage" policy
covering twenty "dealer's plates" to an automobile sales corporation. Twenty
premiums were paid for UM coverage on the fleet.'08 An employee of the cor-
poration was involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist and at-
tempted to "stack" the uninsured motorist coverage on all twenty vehicles.
The maximum UM coverage was $15,000 per vehicle for a potential total ex-
posure of $300,000. The court found that the employee was a named insured
because the policy provided that he would be one of the employees to whom a
95. Id. at 701.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 120 N.H. 718, 422 A.2d 1312 (1980).
99. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1976) (en banc);
see notes 50-68 and accompanying text supra.
100. 120 N.H. at 719, 422 A.2d at 1313.
101. Id. at 721, 422 A.2d at 1315.
102. Id.; see also Comment, supra note 22, at 158-59.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Annot., 25 A.L.R.4th 896, 899 (1983).
106. For a discussion of courts allowing stacking by an occupancy insured see
notes 161-68 and accompanying text infra.
107. 284 Pa. Super. 579, 426 A.2d 646 (1981).
108. Id. at -, 426 A.2d at 647.
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dealer's plate would be issued. 109 The court affirmed an award of $250,000 by
an arbitrator to the employee, thereby allowing stacking.110
The court allowed stacking by the named insured employee even though
he had paid none of the premiums on the policies. Moreover, the court refused
to recognize the limits of liability clause, finding it repugnant to the policy
reasons behind the state Uninsured Motorist Act.111 The court added that it
was irrelevant whether the coverage is contained in a single policy or multiple
policies. The policy justifications for stacking are equally applicable in both.112
In Burns v. Fernandez,1"3 the court refused to permit stacking on a fleet
policy by an occupancy insured. The court intimated, however, that a named
insured would be permitted to stack on a fleet policy. The court noted that
Louisiana had adopted the "premium payment" rationale in Briley v.
Falati.14 The theory behind the premium payment rationale is that those who
pay the premiums (i.e., the named insured) may stack and those who do not
pay for such coverage may not.12 In Fernandez, the employer, New Orleans
Easter Seal Society (NOESS), had taken out a fleet policy covering 26 vans.
The plaintiff was an employee of NOESS and was involved in an accident
with an uninsured motorist while driving one of the Society's vans. The court
held that, since the employer, not the employee/plaintiff, had paid the premi-
ums on the 26 vans, stacking by the employee would not be permitted."1 The
court went on to state in dicta, "[t]he premium payment rationale supports a
finding that the premium paid was only sufficient to permit stacking by
NOESS." 11 Thus, it appears that Louisiana would permit such intra-policy
stacking on a fleet policy by a named insured, since the named insured gener-
ally pays the premiums." 8
In Lundy v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.," 9 the court confronted the
question of whether a named insured would be allowed to stack coverage on
three vehicles insured under one policy. The court upheld such stacking, point-
109. Id. at __, 426 A.2d at 649.
110. Several other courts have allowed intra-policy stacking by a named insured
on a fleet policy. See, e.g., Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Co. v. Andrews, 369 So. 2d
346, 347 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1980), cert.
denied, Andrews v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Co., 381 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1980);
Posey v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 332 So. 2d 909, 915 (La. Ct. App. 1976); see
also Annot., 25 A.L.R.4th 896, 899-903 (1983).
111. 284 Pa. Super. at -, 426 A.2d at 649.
112. Id. at -, 426 A.2d at 649.
113. 401 So. 2d 1033 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
114. 367 So. 2d 1227 (La. Ct. App. 1979), writ denied, 369 So. 2d 1379 (La.
1979). See note 49 and accompanying text supra for other cases adopting the premium
payment rationale.
115. 401 So. 2d at 1037.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Subsequent to this decision, Louisiana enacted anti-stacking legislation. See
note 167 infra.
119. 92 N.J. 550, 458 A.2d 106 (1983).
[Vol. 49
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ing out that there would be no real difference between allowing stacking when
three separate policies had been issued (inter-policy stacking), which the
courts clearly allow, and allowing stacking here, where all three cars happened
to be covered on one piece of paper (intra-policy stacking).2 0
More importantly, the court in dicta approved intra-policy stacking by a
named insured on a fleet policy. 2' The court referred to a classic argument
used by courts opposing such stacking as being "somewhat farfetched." The
court cited the example used by Appleman.' 2'
Appleman hypothesized a situation in which an insured issued a single
policy on a fleet of 1,000 cars, providing UM coverage of $50,000 for each
vehicle. If stacking were allowed, total exposure would be 50 million dollars.
Thus, he argued, courts are reluctant to allow stacking.12 3 The Lundy court
refuted this argument, first pointing out that the above assumes the insurer
was forced to sell the policy.1 24 This, of course, is not the case. Furthermore,
the court stated that presumably an insurer, knowingly and willingly issuing a
policy with a potential liability of 50 million dollars, would adjust the premi-
ums accordingly. The court concluded that in such a situation stacking would
indeed be proper.' 25
Other courts have refused to allow intra-policy stacking by a named in-
sured on a fleet policy.' 26 In Holland v. Hawkeye Security Insurance Co.,' 27
the insurer had issued a policy to an individual doing business as an electric
company. The single policy insured nine automobiles. A named insured was
involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist while operating one of the
vehicles. The policy contained a "limits of liability" clause which the court
upheld, thus precluding stacking by the named insured. The court emphasized
that the state financial responsibility laws set a minimum amount of UM cov-
erage at 10/20 and did not mandate coverage in excess of this amount. Conse-
quently, an insurer is free to limit such coverage to the statutory minimum
amount. 28
120. Id. at - n.2, 458 A.2d at 109 n.2.
121. Id.. at -., 458 A.2d at 109.
122. 8C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5101, at 444, 449-51
(1981).
123. See note 153 and accompanying text infra.
124. 92 N.J. at -, 458 A.2d at 109 n.2.
125. Id.
126. Gallups v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1074, 1076 (N.D. Ala.
1981); Burke v. Aid Ins. Co., 487 F. Supp. 831, 835 (D. Kan. 1980); Holland v. Hawk-
eye Sec. Co., 230 N.W.2d 517, 520-21 (Iowa 1975).
127. 230 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa 1975).
128. Id. at 521; see Annot., 25 A.L.R. 4th 896, 903-04 (1983); cf. the occupancy
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B. Intra-Policy Stacking with Respect to Occupancy Insureds
This situation arises when a guest is riding in the host's car and is in-
volved in an accident with an uninsured motorist. If the guest does not have
UM coverage but the host does, and in fact the host has coverage on several
cars, the question becomes whether the occupancy insured can stack the host's
coverage. In this situation, the occupant is insured only because of his occu-
pancy in the particular insured vehicle. Consequently, the vast majority of
courts refuse to allow stacking of the additional coverage on the other
automobiles in which the occupant was not riding. 129
In Hines v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,130 Warren Harper
owned two automobiles insured under the same policy by the same insurance
company131 Harper loaned his automobile to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
was involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist.132 Harper's policy had
the minimum UM coverage of $20,000 per accident. The plaintiff, as an occu-
pancy insured, attempted to stack the coverage to $40,000.133 The policy con-
tained a "limits of liability" clause. The plaintiff argued that Cameron, which
allowed intra-policy stacking by a named insured, should be extended to the
intra-policy occupancy insured situation.1 3 4
The court refused to extend stacking to this situation. The court distin-
guished the Cameron intra-policy named insured situation by pointing out that
in the named insured setting, the coverage for the named insured is not depen-
dent on presence in an insured vehicle. No coverage exists for an occupancy
insured, however, unless he is riding in the insured vehicle.'35 Obviously, a
guest can only be an occupant in one car at a time and thus should only be
entitled to occupancy insured status with respect to that one vehicle. The court
added that insurers were not statutorily required to provide UM protection to
mere occupants.'3 6 The court also stated that the "limits of liability" clause
129. Moomaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 379 F. Supp. 697, 702 (S.D.
W. Va. 1974); Holloway v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 376 So. 2d 690, 694 (Ala.
1979); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pac., 337 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976), cert.
denied, 351 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1977); Holland v. Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co., 230 N.W.2d
517, 521 (Iowa 1975); Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Kan. 783, 790, 457 P.2d 34,
39 (1969); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stanfield, 581 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Ky. 1979); Hines
v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 656 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Mo. 1983) (en bano); Lopez
v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 98 N.M. 166, 172, 646 P.2d 1230, 1236 (1982); Cunning-
ham v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. 213 Va. 72, -, 189 S.E.2d 832, 835 (1972); Annot., 25
A.L.R. 4th 896, 906-913 (1983) (fleet policies); Annot., 23 A.L.R. 12, 81-88 (1983)
(intra-policy stacking by an occupancy insured on non-fleet policy).
130. 656 S.W.2d 262 (Mo. 1983) (en bane).
131. Id. at 263.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 264. For a discussion of Cameron, see notes 50-68 and accompanying
text supra.
135. 656 S.W.2d at 265.
136. Id. (citing Waltz v. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co., 526 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Mo. Ct.
[Vol. 49
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was clear and unambiguous and did not conflict with the separability clause. 1 37
Furthermore, the Hines court refused to recognize a distinction between fleet
and non-fleet policies. In Linderer v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.,'" the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District had already refused to allow
intra-policy stacking by an occupancy insured on a fleet policy.139 Thus, Hines
confirmed suspicions that intra-policy stacking was precluded for occupancy
insureds under non-fleet as well as fleet policies.
A few courts have allowed an occupancy insured to stack coverage on
non-fleet policies.' 40 In Blocker v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,"' the court
allowed intra-policy stacking by an occupancy insured. In this case, the plain-
tiff was a guest in a car operated by the host. The host insured both the car in
the accident and another under one policy. 42 The host/driver paid a separate
premium for the UM coverage for each vehicle. The court found that the
"limits of liability" clause and the "separability" clause created an ambiguity
which should be resolved against the insurance company. 43 The court refused
to distinguish between named insureds and occupancy insureds, pointing out
that the insurer's own policy provided that both named insureds and those
occupying an insured vehicle were covered."' The court emphasized that the
purpose of the uninsured motorist act was to protect innocent victims from
irresponsible drivers and that the statute requires liberal construction to
achieve this legislative intent."
4 5
The majority of courts refuse to allow stacking by occupancy insureds,
particularly on a fleet policy. Missouri first rejected such "fleet" stacking by
occupancy insureds in Linderer v. Royal Globe Insurance Co."4 In Linderer,
the plaintiff was involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist while he
App. 1975)).
137. Id. The separability clause in this case stated that it was not to be construed
to increase the limits of the company's liability. Id. at 266. Other courts which rely on
the two clauses creating ambiguity lacked such clarifying language. See note 49 supra.
138. 597 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
139. In Hines, the plaintiff attempted to distinguish Linderer on the grounds that
there is a difference between "fleet" coverage as in Linderer, and Hines, where an
individual simply happens to own more than one car. The court found "such a distinc-
tion is difficult to draw on a theoretical basis, especially when an implied limitation on
freedom to contract is involved, and we see no reason for recognizing it." 656 S.W.2d
at 266. For a discussion of intra-policy stacking by an occupancy insured on fleet poli-
cies, see notes 146-68 and accompanying text infra.
140. Estate of Calibuso v. Pacific Ins. Co., 62 Hawaii 424, 428, 616 P.2d 1357,
1360 (1980); Kemp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 183 Mont. 526, 534, 601 P.2d 20, 24 (1979);
Annot., 23 A.L.R.4th 12, 81-85 (1983).
141. 232 Pa. Super. 111, 332 A.2d 476 (1975).
142. Id. at 112, 332 A.2d at 477.
143. Id. at 116, 322 A.2d at 479. The Neal court relied on this same argument
to allow intra-policy stacking by a named insured. Mountain W. Farm Bureau v. Neal,
547 P.2d 79, 82 (Mont. 1976); see notes 70-80 and accompanying text supra.
144. 232 Pa. Super. at 118, 332 A.2d at 479.
145. Id. at 118, 332 A.2d at 479-80.
146. 597 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
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was driving one of his employer's cars. The employer had a fleet of 1,420 cars,
all insured by the same insurer. The employer paid a premium of $5 per vehi-
cle for the uninsured motorist coverage and had the statutory minimum of
$10,000 per person, $20,000 accident on each vehicle. The plaintiff was the
named insured on a personal policy held on his own automobile.14 7
The plaintiff argued that he should be able to stack the coverage available
on each of the 1,420 fleet cars. The defendant argued that the "limits of liabil-
ity" clause clearly precluded such stacking. In Cameron, Missouri allowed in-
tra-policy stacking by a named insured on a non-fleet policy. 148 The Linderer
court refused to extend intra-policy stacking to occupancy insureds.' 49
The court found that the justifications that allowed stacking under multi-
vehicle policies for insureds of the first class (named insureds) is inapplicable
to insureds of the second class (occupancy insureds). 1 0 The Linderer court
first found that the application of the principle of reasonable expectations cut
against allowing stacking. The court quoted Professor Keeton's analysis of this
principle which insures that "'[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of ap-
plicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts
will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would
have negated those expectations!' "' The court then cited Lambert v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co.152 with approval. The Lambert court said that an indi-
vidual would reasonably expect that the insurer would honor the UM coverage
on each automobile he owned and therefore allowed intra-policy stacking with
respect to named insureds. An individual would not necessarily have this same
expectation, however, when the coverage arises merely because of his occu-
pancy in the vehicle.15 1
A named insured who purchases UM protection on two vehicles expects
147. Id. at 657.
148. See notes 50-68 and accompanying text supra.
149. 597 S.W.2d at 661.
150. Id.
151. R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 6.3(A), AT 351 (1971).
152. 331 So. 2d 260, 264 (Ala. 1976).
153. 597 S.W.2d at 661. In Lambert v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 260
(Ala. 1976), the court precluded intra-policy stacking by an occupancy insured under a
fleet policy. The court applied the principle of reasonable expectations as set forth by
Professor Keeton. The court stated:
Can it be seriously contended that Seaboard [the employer] expected that the
$4.00 premium it paid for uninsured motorist coverage on each of its 1,699
vehicles would purchase coverage for all permissive occupants of its vehicles
to the tune of $16,900,000? Clearly, such an expectation would not have been
a reasonable one under the terms of the commercial fleet policy here in ques-
tion. The status of Lambert (for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage) as
an insured solely by virtue of his occupancy of the vehicle, is clearly distin-
guishable from the status of a named insured who is entitled to stack cover-
ages by virtue of his personal payment of an additional premium for each
vehicle insured under a multi-vehicle policy.
331 So. 2d at 265.
[Vol. 49
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol49/iss3/4
STACKING INSURANCE COVERAGE
to be able to recover in accordance with the coverage he paid for. Moreover,
an insured would expect similar recovery on both policies if a member of his
family were injured. The court drew a distinction, however, with respect to a
fleet policy. The court stated that it is not reasonable for an employee to ex-
pect coverage under all policies insuring a corporate fleet of 1,420 vehicles.
One would not expect coverage up to $14,200,000 (the total coverage if stack-
ing were allowed) merely because the employee happened to be occupying one
vehicle of the fleet at the time of the accident.l r5 The court went on to say that
allowing stacking in such a situation would clearly be contrary to the intent of
the legislature:
If stacking were required for fleet policies there would be $14,200,000 of
coverage for each Union Electric vehicle and the total exposure for the entire
fleet of 1,420 vehicles would be 1,420 times $14,200,000 or $20,164,000,000,
obviously an argument to absurdity, but the actual exposure amounts to mil-
lions of dollars.155
The court added that to allow such stacking would be unconscionable, since
there would be no way the insurer could limit the coverage of a fleet to less
than millions of dollars for each vehicle. 156
In the named insured, intra-policy stacking setting, courts frequently al-
low stacking on the premise that the insured paid for the coverage and there-
fore should be allowed to collect. The Linderer court said that in the occu-
pancy insured arena, the "premium payment" rationale was inapplicable.
Moreover, the court refused to accept the argument that a denial of stacking
allows the insurer to collect a premium and then take away the coverage.
15 7
The court pointed out that denying stacking merely prohibited the shifting of
coverage from one vehicle to another. The coverage on the vehicle not involved
in the accident is still in force, but cannot be shifted to the vehicle involved in
the accident. Thus, the insured gets what he paid for.158 Accordingly, the
Linderer court refused to extend intra-policy stacking to occupancy in-
sureds. 59 The court allowed coverage under the employer policy covering the
specific car in which the employee was driving. Moreover, stacking was al-
lowed with the employer policy covering the specific car, and the coverage
provided by the plaintiff's personal policy. This is merely the inter-policy
stacking situation which the Missouri court upheld in Steinhaeufel v. Reliance
154. 597 S.W.2d at 661.
155. Id. At least one court finds this hypothetical somewhat "farfetched" and
believes insurers take this into account in rate-setting. See notes 119-25 and accompa-
nying text supra.
156. 597 S.W.2d at 661; cf. Lundy v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 92 N.J. 550,
458 A.2d 106, 109 n.2 (1983) (insurance company presumably would adjust its
rates to cover large expenses); notes 119-25 and accompanying text supra.
157. 597 S.W.2d at 661.
158. Id.
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Very few courts have allowed intra-policy stacking by an occupancy in-
sured on a fleet policy. In Holmes v. Reliance Insurance Co., 6' plaintiff Ken-
neth Byoune was driving a car owned by his employer, Humphrey Chevrolet
Company. The car was a "demonstrator" and Humphrey Chevrolet main-
tained a garage liability policy issued by Reliance Insurance Company. 62 Re-
liance covered 160 automobiles under this policy and a charge of $3 per
"dealer plate" was assessed for the uninsured motorist protection.163
The court allowed stacking of the uninsured motorist protection provided
on all 160 cars. 64 The court relied on Wilkinson v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
Co.,16' an earlier decision where intra-policy stacking by a named insured was
allowed. In Wilkinson, the court relied on the double-premiums rationale.
Since the insured purchased uninsured motorist coverage on several cars and
paid separate premiums for each, the insured was entitled to stack.'60 The
Holmes court extended this rule to any other insured as defined in the UM
section of the policy, such as an occupancy insured. 67 The court noted that
160. 495 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); see notes 15-21 and accompanying
text supra.
161. 359 So. 2d 1102 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
162. Id. at 1104.
163. The policy itself, however, did not designate this as a "fleet" policy. Id.
164. Id. at 1106.
165. 298 So. 2d 915 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
166. 359 So. 2d at 1106.
167. Id. Louisiana has enacted anti-stacking legislation. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
22:1406(D)(1)(c) (West 1978) provides:
If the insured has any limits of uninsured motorist coverage in a policy of
automobile liability insurance, in accordance with the terms of Subsection
D(1), then such limits of liability shall not be increased because of multiple
motor vehicles covered under said policy of insurance and such limits of unin-
sured motorist coverage shall not be increased when the insured has insurance
available to him under more than one uninsured motorist coverage provision
or policy; provided, however, that with respect to other insurance available,
the policy of insurance or endorsement shall provide the following. ...
The statute goes on to define the UM coverage on the vehicle in which the injured
party was an occupant as the primary policy, thereby preventing the problem courts
face in determining which policy shall be deemed primary. See note 12 supra for a
brief discussion of the primary/secondary dilemma. Subsection (ii) provides:
Should that primary uninsured motorist coverage be exhausted due to
the extent of damages, then the injured occupant may recover any excess
from other uninsured motorist coverage available to him. In no instance shall
more than one coverage from more than one uninsured motorist policy be
available as excess over and above the primary coverage available to the in-
jured occupant.
For cases applying the anti-stacking statute, see Block v. Reliance Ins. Co., 433 So. 2d
1040 (La. 1983); Herbert v. Breaux, 398 So. 2d 1299 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 401
So. 2d 986 (La. 1981); Thibodeaux v. Oliver, 394 So. 2d 684 (La. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 397 So. 2d 1360 (La. 1981).
Florida has also enacted anti-stacking legislation. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4132
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the insured had paid three dollars per dealer plate and 160 cars were covered
by UM protection. The insured was thus entitled to stack.
IV. CONCLUSION
The majority of states now require insurers to offer a statutory minimum
of UM coverage if the insurer desires to issue policies within the state. Conse-
quently, there has been substantial recent litigation concerning the ability of
policy holders to "stack" UM coverage. In order to promote the financial re-
sponsibility laws of the given state, and to protect the insured who has pur-
chased such protection, courts are permitting stacking in an increasing number
of situations.
The vast majority of courts allow inter-policy stacking, particularly by a
named insured. Many courts are extending this stacking to the intra-policy
setting, with several courts going so far as to allow intra-policy stacking by an
occupancy insured. Although the courts are divided as to when, if ever, stack-
ing is allowed, it is clear that the current trend is to allow stacking in an
increasing number of situations.
DAVID M. PETERSON
(West Supp. 1974-1983) states:
If an insured or named insured is protected by any type of motor vehicle
insurance policy for liability, personal injury protection, or other coverage, the
policy shall provide that the insured or named insured is protected only to the
extent of the coverage he has on the vehicle involved in the accident. How-
ever, if none of the insured's or named insured's vehicles is involved in the
accident, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on any one of
the vehicles with applicable coverage. Coverage on any other vehicles shall
not be added to or stacked upon that coverage.
This section does not apply:
(1) To uninsured motorist coverage.
(2) To reduce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies insuring
different named insureds.
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Piatt, 417 So. 2d 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
168. 359 So. 2d at 1106.
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